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Abstract—Online advertising has become the backbone of
the Internet economy by revolutionizing business marketing. It
provides a simple and efficient way for advertisers to display
their advertisements to specific individual users, and over the
last couple of years has contributed to an explosion in the
income stream for several web-based businesses. For example,
Google’s income from advertising grew 51.6% between 2016 and
2018, to $136.8 billion. This exponential growth in advertising
revenue has motivated fraudsters to exploit the weaknesses of
the online advertising model to make money, and researchers
to discover new security vulnerabilities in the model, to propose
countermeasures and to forecast future trends in research.
Motivated by these considerations, this paper presents a
comprehensive review of the security threats to online advertising
systems. We begin by introducing the motivation for online
advertising system, explain how it differs from traditional adver-
tising networks, introduce terminology, and define the current
online advertising architecture. We then devise a comprehensive
taxonomy of attacks on online advertising to raise awareness
among researchers about the vulnerabilities of online advertising
ecosystem. We discuss the limitations and effectiveness of the
countermeasures that have been developed to secure entities in
the advertising ecosystem against these attacks. To complete
our work, we identify some open issues and outline some
possible directions for future research towards improving security
methods for online advertising systems.
Index Terms—Online Advertising Systems, Security, Ad Fraud,
Click Fraud, Taxonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the past few years, the widespread adoption ofthe Internet has led to the emergence of a new form
of online business – i.e., online advertising – to make money
through this means. A significant financial pillar of the Internet
ecosystem is provided by online advertising [1]–[4].
Many companies such as Google and Microsoft have in-
creased their investment in online advertising to improve their
revenue and sales. According to the report in [5], Google’s
income from advertising grew 51.6% between 2016 and 2018,
to $136.8 billion. It is expected that this revenue will reach
nearly $203.4 billion by 2020 and will continue to increase
over time.
Online advertising uses the same mechanisms that are
applied to manage other “traditional” advertising channels,
such as newspapers, radio or TV, but is much more creative
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in providing targeted and personalized advertisements [6], [7].
Thanks to the rise of the Internet and online advertising, sales
of TV and radio advertisements have stagnated, and those
of newspaper advertisements have dropped. Fig. 1 shows a
comparison of global ad spending by medium [8].
Online advertising provides profit for all the components
of the system, such as publishers, advertisers, and advertising
network (or ad network). Given the high profits involved, the
online advertising system is an obvious target for fraud. Hence,
several attacks on the current online advertising market have
been identified that have targeted various entities in the market,
such as hacking [9], click fraud [10], malvertising [11],
adware [12], and inflight modification of advertising (ad)
traffic [13].
The value of the global online advertising market is ex-
pected to reach $225 billion in 2020, so it is not surprising
that fraudsters are attempting to steal a piece of the pie [14].
The study in [15] argues that the total ad spend lost to fraud
exceeded $23.7 billion in 2019. The level of fraud is expected
to reach $32 billion by 2022.
The inherent lack of transparency and complexity of the
online advertising ecosystem give rise to higher risks, and
an adversary can easily exploit these aspects to engage in
fraudulent activities and launch an attack on the system. Ad
fraud can occur in various forms and may involve fooling
different components of the online advertising ecosystem to
make money. For instance, dishonest publishers may deceive
advertisers into paying an extra fee, or hackers could hijack
an advertising slot to gain revenue for themselves.
In view of the factors described above, the success and pop-
ularity of the online advertising ecosystem depend primarily
on the level of security that can provide against such malicious
threats. The considerations mentioned above motivate the
current work in terms of studying security issues in the online
advertising market and essential related techniques.
A. Contributions
This article presents a survey that primarily targets the
security issues and challenges of online advertising systems
and reviews the related fundamental concepts. From a security
perspective, it presents a comprehensive taxonomy of well-
known ad fraud. It also categorizes several security mecha-
nisms that have been proposed in recent years to cope with
and mitigate the existing security challenges in the online
advertising industry. In particular, our classification focuses
on the goals of attacks, the revenue model, and the primary
component targets.
Numerous existing works have discussed general aspects of
online advertising systems. Most of the early works focused
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Figure 1: Global ad spending by medium.
on issues relating to the economic aspects of advertising [16]–
[20], challenges in online advertising [21], theoretical or
analytical assessments of sponsored searches [22]–[24], and
especially analyses of privacy threats and protection mecha-
nisms [25]–[27]. However, none of the existing works address
security issues with an emphasis on online ad fraud in this
area. There is therefore a need for a concise survey to provide
a reader who is planning to undertake research in this field with
a classification of online ad fraud, along with an exhaustive
review of the corresponding countermeasures. In brief, the
essential contributions of the survey are as follows:
• First, some essential background knowledge is presented,
including the differences between traditional and current
online advertising systems, the terminology used, and the
existing architecture of online advertising. The goal is
to enable new readers to gain the required familiarity
with online advertising systems and its underlying tech-
nologies, such as revenue models and the payment of
commissions.
• We present a detailed taxonomy of the current security
threats to online advertising. We investigate several pos-
sibilities, including both theoretical and practical vulner-
abilities, that fraudsters can use to launch an attack on
the online advertising industry. In addition, we present
a detailed discussion of the goals of these attacks, the
revenue model, and the primary component targets.
• We review several cutting-edge solutions that address
security threats to online advertising systems, and explain
the advantages and disadvantages of each solution.
• Finally, we identify a number of open challenges and fu-
ture research directions in the field of online advertising,
with particular attention to the security aspects.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing surveys
that have reviewed and summarized the existing security vul-
nerabilities and outlined future research directions in the realm
of online advertising systems. Motivated by this consideration,
the main goals of this study are threefold: (i) to help the reader
to understand the scope and consequences of the security
threats and challenges in the domain of online advertising
systems; (ii) to estimate the potential damage associated with
these threats; and (iii) to highlight paths that are likely to
lead to the detection and containment of these threats. From a
practical perspective, our research aims to raise awareness in
the online advertising research community of the urgent need
to prevent various attacks from disrupting the healthy online
advertising market.
B. Roadmap
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In
Section II, we explain the differences between the online
advertising system and traditional advertising networks, in-
troduce the terminology used, and describe its architecture.
Section III presents our proposed taxonomy of attacks on
the online advertising system. We also discuss the goal of
these attacks, the revenue model, and the primary targets.
In Section IV, we categorize and discuss various security
solutions identified in the literature and present a preliminary
overview of the advantages and disadvantages of the use of
these solutions in online advertising systems. In Section V, we
highlight several open challenges for future research in online
advertising systems. We conclude our work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
Today, when users visit any website using a PC or mobile
device, they are often presented with advertising content.
Advertising helps publishers to disseminate their materials and
grab the audience’s attention. They also can sell space on their
sites to gain income from advertising or for other purposes.
We begin this section with a brief introduction to the
current online advertising system, and then compare it with
the traditional approach in Section II-A. Section II-B then
explains some of the most widely used terminology associated
with the online advertising ecosystem, including terms used in
the remainder of the present article. To gain insight into how
online advertising networks operate, we discuss the current
architecture in Section II-C. Next, different methods of tar-
geted advertising and the most common types of ad campaign
(revenue model) are described in Sections II-D and II-E,
respectively. Finally, we explore the way in which advertisers
pay commission fees to commissioners and publishers in
Section II-F, and review the types of adversaries who are likely
to launch attacks on online advertising systems in Section II-G.
For ease of reading, in Table I, we list the all abbreviations
used in this paper.
A. What is Online Advertising?
Not surprisingly, advertising techniques have evolved over
time with the growth of the Internet, and online advertising
has become one of the biggest and most profitable Internet
businesses. The main idea behind online advertising is to
provide an advertiser with a cost-effective, easy, fast, and
flexible way to promote and sell their products through the
Internet to suitable customers. There are several significant
differences between current online advertising and traditional
advertising (e.g., via television, radio, and newspapers). For
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Table I: List of abbreviations and corresponding descriptions.
Abbreviation Description
Ad Advertising
Ad Network Advertising Network
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
CPC Cost per Click
CPM Cost per Impression Mile
CPA Cost per Action
MITM Man-In-The-Middle
DNS Domain Name System
Adware Advertising Software
CTR Click-Through Rate
TTP Trusted Third Party
CGI Common Gateway Interface
GBF Group Blooms Filter
TBF Timing Blooms Filter
ISP Internet Service Provider
SLEUTH Single-publisher attack dEtection Using correlaTion Hunting
NMF Non-negative Matrix Factorization
CAPTCHA Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
IoT Internet of Things
AI Artificial Intelligence
AR Augmented Reality
5G 5th Generation of Mobile Internet
ML Machine Learning
DLT Distributed Ledger Technology
API Application Programming Interface
example, traditional advertising uses massive broadcast adver-
tisements without considering the user’s interests; in contrast,
online advertising can deliver advertisements to targeted users
based on their interests and browsing behavior, regardless of
geographical barriers.
B. Terminology
In this section, we define some essential terminology related
to online advertising ecosystems, as used throughout this
paper.
• An advertiser is a party who is willing to show a product,
service, or event to the user via advertisements, in order
to promote sales or attendance. Advertisers typically pay
(or buy traffic from) an advertising network (ad network)
to display their advertisements in the advertising space on
publishers’ websites or phone applications. The publisher
also receives a percentage of this fee.
• A publisher is an entity that receives money (via selling
traffic) from advertisers by displaying their advertisements
to users through its web pages.
• A user is an individual who visits a publisher’s web pages..
• An advertising network (such as Google, Yahoo, Google
AdSense, Media.net, or PulsePoint) also known as a com-
missioner, is part of an ad exchange. It acts as a broker
between the advertiser and the publisher to manage the
interaction between them [28], and is responsible for finding
suitable spaces to present advertisements on publishers’
websites for advertisers. They may also buy or sell ad traffic
(as ad requests), either internally or together with other ad
networks.
• An ad exchange (such as DoubleClick [29], AdECN [30],
or OpenX [31]) is a graph of the ad networks that allows
the advertiser and publisher to serve advertisements more
effectively within an advertising space.
• Ad servers are a type of web server (or platform) that is used
to host the content of an online advertisement and distribute
this content on digital platforms such as Facebook, Quora,
Twitter, etc.
• An advertising request (ad request) is a query, in the form of
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic, that is triggered
by a web user’s impressions or clicks, and calls an ad server
to display an ad to the user.
• Sections (also known as zones or regions) are components
in the form of a block of space on a web page that can help
a publisher to load advertisements dynamically (by placing
these sections inside their web pages) rather than exposing
the same content using static advertisements.
• Creative content is associated with the actual advertising
message (e.g., an anchor tag, an Adobe Flash animation,
text, or images) in the ad slot displayed to the user. The
process of linking an ad message to an advertiser’s website
is called click-through [32].
• An ad server enumerates a click event when a user clicks
on an ad.
• An ad server counts an impression event whenever the
content or ad page is loaded for the user. Clicks and
impressions generate two different events, which are handled
separately in the online advertising system.
• An auction is a competitive process that runs within the ad
exchange. It is designed to allow each advertiser to bid for
advertisement space, where the highest bidder is permitted
to place an advertisement in the slot. An auction aims to
generate more profit for publishers. In general, the time
taken to complete the entire process is on the order of 100
ms.
• After an auction, ad networks may perform arbitrage to
increase their revenue. To initiate arbitrage, the ad network
must run a new and independent auction by buying and
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Figure 2: Architecture of current online advertising systems.
reselling traffic from the publisher.
• An ad campaign is a method that emerged to help advertis-
ers to decide how much to pay when their advertisements
are displayed. We discuss the most common forms of ad
campaigns in Section II-E.
• A banner is a space on a page that displays a message from
the advertiser.
C. Architecture of Online Advertising
In this subsection, we briefly review the infrastructure of
an online advertising system and describe how such network
typically works.
Fig. 2 shows an architecture for an online advertising
system. This scheme relies on the integration of four main
components: an advertiser, a publisher, an ad exchange (e.g.,
multiple ad networks), and a user.
The process of ad serving in an online advertising system
is illustrated in Fig. 3. The process is initiated when a user
request calls for an advertisement to be served by the publisher
(step 1-2). Following this, the publisher asks the ad exchange
to fetch the ad that best matches the user’s profile and has
the best price (step 3). The ad exchange starts an auction
between multiple advertisers to determine which can make the
most profit for the publisher and consequently for the whole
network [33] (step 4). Finally, the highest paying advertiser
(winning bidder) wins the auction (step 5) and its ad is served
and displayed to the user (steps 6-7).
D. Targeted Advertising
The most obvious difference between online advertising
and a traditional approach is that the former displays ad-
vertisements to the customer based on their interests, while
in the latter, advertisements are massively broadcast without
considering the customer’s interests. Ad networks use ad
targeting methods to increase their income, and in this way can
display advertisements based on the user’s preferences. The
User visits a webpage User requests to show Ad
Publisher asks Ad Exchange 
to fetch Ad
Winning bid is selected
Ad dispays for the given user 
Call advertisers for auction
Ad created is served
User
Webpage
Publisher
Ad ExchangeAdvertiser
Winning 
bidder
Ad webpage
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2
35
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Figure 3: The process of serving advertisements in an online
advertising system.
three most popular types of ad targeting can be categorized
into contextual, behavioral, and location-based approaches.
In the contextual approach, advertisers display relevant
advertisements by focusing solely on the content of the web
page being viewed by the user [34]. A behavioral targeting
strategy allows advertisers and publishers to utilize informa-
tion from the user’s browsing history (e.g., by monitoring the
behavior of the user on the Internet) to customize the types of
advertisements they are served. Whenever an individual visits
a website, all of the relevant information, including the pages
visited, the period of time spent on each page, the links that are
clicked on, and the things that are interacted with, are stored in
a profile linked to that visitor [35]. Based on the data in these
profiles, publishers can show related advertisements to visitors
that match their habits. In a location-based targeting, location-
specific advertisements are delivered to potential users; this
technique is particularly useful for mobile advertising [36].
E. Revenue Models
In this subsection, we discuss how entities in the online
advertising network generate revenue.
Typically, publishers agree to display an advertiser’s ad-
vertisements and share the keywords used by the advertiser
in their website, charging a commission fee for the action(s)
generated by the user. This agreement includes a contract made
by a broker (also called an Internet advertising commissioner)
between publishers and advertisers. The commissioner also
controls the advertisers’ budget, to avoid over-spending [37].
As soon as the advertiser pays the publisher the commission
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fee, it displays links determined by the advertiser on its
website [38].
The general models [32], [36] used by publishers to make
money through advertising are determined based on the num-
bers of impressions, clicks, and actions. We explain each of
these types of revenue model in detail in the following sub-
sections.
1) Cost per Impression: This model is favored by pub-
lishers and was developed based on traditional advertising
systems. A metric called Cost Per impression Mile (CPM)
is often used to measure the cost per impression, where the
advertiser’ payment to the ad network is calculated based on
the cost of 1,000 views of an ad.
To enable a better understanding of how the commissioners
process the receiving impression traffic, Fig. 4a illustrates this
process. As shown in the figure, advertisements are loaded
along with the page requested in the user’s browser. The
steps are as follows: (1) a user requests a website; (2) in
response, the publisher displays the requested website in the
user’s web browser; and (3) the user’s browser redirects to
the commissioner’s web server (the commissioner does not
repeat advertisements since it stores the recent advertisements
shown to the user in browser cookies). In steps 4 and 5,
the commissioner allows the user’s browser to redirect to
the advertiser server. In step 6, the commissioner loads the
advertisement into the user’s browser.
2) Cost per Click: In the Cost Per Click (CPC) model,
the advertiser pays the publisher based on how many times a
viewer clicks the ad on the publisher’s web page. Many search
engines, including Yahoo, Microsoft, and Google, prefer to use
the CPC model. The reason for that is because a user clicking
on an ad is a strong signal of interest; as such, CPC guarantees
a better return on investment than CPM, where advertisers pay
for their advertisements to be shown without counting on any
implicit feedback from users.
The click traffic model is the approach that is most similar
to the impression traffic model. Fig. 4b illustrates this scheme.
As shown in the figure, when a user clicks on a hyperlink on
the publisher’s site, the user is redirected to the commissioner’s
server. The server then logs the click for accounting purposes.
After that, the server of the advertising commissioner redirects
the user’swebbrowserto the web page related to the advertiser.
3) Cost per Action: In general, the CPC charging model
is considered to be a specific case of the Cost Per Action
(CPA) model, in which the publisher is paid whenever a user-
generated click leads to a predefined action being performed,
e.g., filling in a form on the page, signing up, registering,
or downloading an item corresponding to the ad. Advertisers
prefer to deploy this type of cost model since they only pay
the publisher for specific actions. Although this approach has
advantages for the advertiser, it also has some drawbacks. It is
challenging to implement, especially in the case of complex
actions, and the publisher is less interested in applying this
model since dishonest advertisers may deflate the number of
actions to pay a lower commission fee (See Section III-B2).
F. Payment of commissions in online advertising systems
In this subsection, we briefly explain how advertisers pay
commission fees to commissioners and publishers.
When advertisers receive valid traffic generated from im-
pressions or clicks, they have to pay the publisher. The
commissioner also earns a fraction of this income. If the
advertiser uses a similar scheme to pay the publisher, then
the commissioner’s percentage will be calculated at a fixed
rate. For example, in the case where an advertiser pays a
publisher per click (or impression), and the publisher receives
the money based on the number of clicks (or impressions),
then the commissioner receives a fixed payment.
However, an advertiser may pay based on the number of
sales, while the publisher earns per click (or impression). This
practice is known as an arbitrage campaign [37]. In formal
terms, an arbitrage campaign is one where the advertiser
uses different payment metrics to pay the commissioner and
publisher. In an arbitrage campaigns, the commissioner should
ensure that its share of the profit from the advertiser is more
than the publisher’s payment; otherwise, the commissioner
loses money. In reality, advertisers prefer to pay based on
sales, while publishers prefer to receive income according
to the number of impressions or clicks. Hence, Internet ad-
vertising schemes are mainly arbitrage campaigns. However,
some advertisers may prefer to pay on the basis of clicks or
impressions for product branding.
G. Adversary
We can classify adversaries who attack an online advertising
system into two types: selfish and malicious adversaries. A
selfish adversary is one who exploits the vulnerabilities in the
online advertising system to divert a portion of the ad income
for him- or herself, while the aim of the malicious type is
to launch an attack with fraudulent or malicious intent (e.g.,
hurting a competitor, executing or spreading malware). As all
of the entities in the online advertising ecosystem benefit from
the delivery of advertisements to customers, they may all play
the role of the adversary to increase their profits. There are
several different ways that these attacks can be launched. De-
pending on the amount of resources available to the adversary,
these may range from a simple attack using a single machine
to an enormous number of machines performing an automated
attack.
One example of the standard tools that are currently used to
launch distributed attacks and perpetrate ad fraud is a botnet.
To build a botnet, a botmaster (an entity who controls the
botnet remotely) needs a network of software robots – i.e.,
bots – that are run independently. Bots turn a compromised
machine into a member of a botnet. The system can then be
used to perform denial-of-service attack, send spam, or steal
sensitive personal information. An adversary who wants to
carry out a fraud via a botnet can either create a custom botnet
or rent one from an existing botmaster.
III. SECURITY: TAXONOMY OF ATTACKS ON ONLINE
ADVERTISING SYSTEMS
As described above, web browsing and online advertising
systems are still dependent on HTTP, with no guarantee of the
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(b) Steps in the click traffic model
Figure 4: Traffic models used in online advertising systems.
comprehensive authenticity and the integrity of web content.
Consequently, adversaries can exploit the lack of a secure
protocol to engage in fraudulent activities and perform attacks
to increase their profits. In view of the large amounts of money
at stake, it is unsurprising that all components involved in
online advertising systems are concerned about the security
of these systems. Since this type of system is becoming a
notable revenue source for many online businesses, attacks can
threaten the industry model of the participating stakeholders,
and there are significant concerns over the future of the
Internet.
Online advertising systems are vulnerable to various types
of attacks, and in this section, we presents a taxonomy of
current attack methods. We classify online advertising attack
methods into five main categories: hacking, ad fraud, malver-
tising, inflight modification of ad traffic, and adware. Fig. 5
illustrates the proposed taxonomy.
The rest of this section explains, for each type of attack,
how an adversary can exploit the risks in online advertising
systems and conduct ad fraud. We review the methods that
fraudsters use to gain money from online advertising systems,
and present a detailed discussion of the goals of these attacks,
and identify which revenue model is the goal of the adversary
and which components of the online business system could be
the primary targets. To aid in comprehension, the results of
this comparison are presented in Table II.
A. Hacking
The threat of hacking in online advertising arises due to
unauthorized access to campaign accounts [9]. One of the most
effective ways for companies to scale their businesses, make
more money and find new customers is to use online adver-
tising. In search engine advertising, companies aim to attract
customers by improving the visibility of their advertisements
in results pages. The primary factors in the success of an online
advertising business include flexibility, cost savings, time,
and quality. Many companies utilize online advertising for
these reasons [39]–[41]. Online campaigns can quickly adapt
information in their ad campaigns, which are more flexible, tar-
geted, and tailored than traditional marketing campaigns. The
flexibility and time savings of online campaigns guarantee that
the transaction processing will be fast. An example of this is
AdWords [42], a tool developed by Google to allow advertisers
to create online campaigns in only a few minutes. However,
despite all the above advantages to online business, online
campaigns face with many challenges, including security and
privacy.
We illustrate this with an example. Consider the case where
an advertiser creates an AdWords account. Users navigate
via the web to run search queries, and advertisements can
be presented on the websites of publishers or on the search
engine network. If an adversary takes control of the adver-
tiser’s AdWords account to launch an attack, this is known
as hacking. The consequences of campaign accounts being
hacked include blocking, limited access or unauthorized entry
to the account of the advertiser. The availability of short-
term online campaigns will also be limited. These results may
lead to significant reputational damage, loss of money, and
violations of user privacy. Fig. 6 illustrates the hacking of an
advertiser’s AdWords account.
B. Click Fraud
Online advertisements help to develop a healthy internet,
since they provide financial support for the online businesses.
The emergence of click fraud (also known as malicious clicks,
or click spam [47]) therefore poses a serious security risk to the
internet ecosystem. Click fraud refers to cybercrime activity
that is carried out either manually (using human clickers)
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Figure 5: Proposed taxonomy of ad fraud attacks in online advertising systems.
Table II: Summary of attacks, description, attack goal, revenue model goal and primary component targets in online advertising system.
Revenue Model Goal Primary Component TargetsAttack Description Attack Goal CPC CPM CPA Advertiser Publisher User Ad Network
Hacking [9] Unauthorized access to campaign accounts Hacker aims at taking over control of ad-
vertiser’s account
7 7 7 3 7 7 7
Crowd Fraud [43] Malicious behaviors by humans against
competitors for specific targets
Increase fraudulent traffic 3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Badvertising [44] Utilizing malicious JavaScript code to pub-
lish invisible automatic advertisements in
the user’s browser
Increase the number of clicks 3 7 7 3 7 7 7
Hit Shaving [45] Dishonest advertisers claim that they re-
ceived less traffic than in reality
Dishonest advertisers omit to pay commis-
sion on some of the received traffic to the
publisher
3 7 3 7 3 7 7
Hit Inflation [46] Artificial inflation of the actual amount of
traffic
Economic advantage from over-counting
the numbers of transactions
3 3 3 3 3 7 7
Malvertising [13] Perpetrators inject malicious code into le-
gitimate online advertising networks to
spread malware
Malicious code, eventually, attempts to
redirect users to malicious websites
7 7 7 7 7 3 7
Inflight Modifica-
tion of Ad Traf-
fic [13]
Infecting the system to show altered search
results along with modified advertisements
to the users
Generate revenue fraudulently for ad net-
works and publishers
3 7 7 3 3 3 3
Adware [13] Advertising software to display advertise-
ments with out the users’ permission in
order to generate revenue
Generate revenue based on the collected
marketing information or displaying adver-
tisements
3 7 7 3 3 7 7
Publisher 
Hacker/ Botnets/ 
Ad Fraud User
Owns
AdWords 
Account
Advertiser
Hac
king
Search Engine
Display of Advertisments
Figure 6: Hacking attack in online advertising network.
or automatically (software-supported) to generate fraudulent
clicks on the advertisement to make illegal profits.
Fraudulent clicks can damage the health of online busi-
nesses, since these clickers can increase their profits or deplete
the advertising budgets of their competitors. They achieve this
by clicking on advertisements with no actual interest in the
content.
In the manual approach, fraud consists of hiring a group
of people to increase fraudulent traffic, while automatic click
fraud attack is usually based on the use of botnets [48].
Malicious software called a “clickbot” [49] is one example
of this use of botnets to generate fraudulent clicks automat-
ically [50]. Using a clickbot to launch a click fraud attack
is more efficient than the manual type of attack, since it
can perform automatic clicking over a time period of several
minutes to avoid detection. We can categorize click fraud into
two types, crowd fraud and conventional ad fraud, as described
the following subsections.
1) Crowd Fraud: The emergence of crowdsourcing [51]
has led to a novel form of fraud in online advertising, since
it can broadcast a large number of tasks to a numerous online
workers. Due to the openness of crowdsourcing systems [52]–
[54], a crowd of workers can easily be recruited via mali-
cious crowdsourcing platforms to perform an attack against
a competitor or to increase their advertising expenses. There
are many differences between automatic fraudulent behav-
iors (conventional fraud), and frauds carried out by humans.
For example, a vast number of workers via crowdsourcing
platforms can be involved in human-generated fraud, while
automatic fraudulent traffic can be deployed relatively few
machines. A difficulty also arises in differentiating normal and
no distinct traffic induced by real humans from the noisy traffic
generated by machines. Methods used to detect conventional
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fraud therefore fail to identify these human-generated frauds.
The phenomenon of exploiting a group of real humans to
increase fraudulent traffic in online advertising is termed crowd
fraud [43].
2) Conventional Ad Fraud: In contrast to crowd fraud,
which is carried out by large numbers of attacking machines,
normal and no distinct click behaviors by each web worker,
the limited fake traffic generated by each web worker, conven-
tional forms of advertising fraud often have specific features
in terms of individual behavior patterns, with few sources
and large amounts of traffic. In this regard, the detection
of conventional fraud is more straightforward than crowd
fraud [43].
We divided the conventional advertising frauds shown in
Fig. 5 into three categories: badvertising, hit shaving, and hit
inflation. A brief overview of how these attacks are carried
out on online advertising ecosystems is given below.
• Badvertising. Gandhi et al. defined badvertisement as a
kind of camouflaged click fraud attack on the advertis-
ing industry [44] that silently and automatically generates
click-through on an advertisement when users visit the
website. This attack can not only remain undetected by
web publishers, but also does not compromise the user’s
machine. Unlike a traditional malware-based click fraud
attack [55], badvertisement is a stealthy offense in the form
of a malicious mutation of spam and phishing [56] attacks,
except that this attack targets the unaware advertiser as the
victim rather than an individual. This is very worrying, since
it is easier for an attacker to deceive an individual into
visiting a web page than to damage a machine with malware.
This attack artificially and stealthily increases the number
of clicks on ad banners hosted by the fraudster or unaware
associates to generate more revenue for the attacker through
advertising. The revenue generated in this way is transferred
from the advertiser to the hosting websites by the fraudster.
Badvertisement has two main components: (i) delivery,
which either transfers consumers to corrupt data or corrupt
data to consumers; and (ii) execution, which automatically
and invisibly displays advertisements to a targeted user.
This stealth attack can be accomplished by corrupting the
JavaScript code that is downloaded and executed by the
client’s browser to publish sponsored advertisements [57].
Online advertisement systems typically work by placing a
JavaScript snippet file into a publisher’s web page. When-
ever a user visits this page and downloads an advertisement
from the ad server, the JavaScript file will be executed.
Downloading the ad causes the frame in the JavaScript
file to be rewritten with the HTML code required to show
the advertisement. The publisher relies on the click-through
payment process to count the number of times the user clicks
on the link to the ad provider’s server. Finally, the user is
referred to the ad client’s website. This scenario is illustrated
in Fig. 7.
Badvertisements run extra malicious scripts to automatically
deploy clicks. In a nutshell, after running the script code and
rewriting the frame, the malicious script parses the HTML
code and compiles all links. It then changes the web page
to embed an HTML iframe. If the user decides to click the
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Figure 7: Typical online advertisement services.
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Figure 8: Auto-clicking in a hidden badvertisement.
link, the iframe will be activated in the background, and
loads its content to exploit the user (Fig. 8).
• Hit Shaving. Advertisers often prefer the CPA model for
online advertising since they pay the publisher based on
the desired user action, rather than for each click on their
ad. However, the CPA model is vulnerable to hit shaving
(also called deflation fraud [58]). In this attack, a fraudulent
advertiser undercounts the real transactions to pay a lower
commission fee. Inflation fraud includes the problem of
deflation fraud, where an entity fraudulently over-counts or
over-reports transactions to gain more revenue.
Before describing how the hit shaving attack is applied in
an advertising network, we need to give an overview of the
mechanisms used in click-through payment programs.
Electronic online commerce is crawling gradually, while the
Internet has rapidly become recognized as an effective ad-
vertising medium. Hence, advertising has become a pivotal
technology on the Internet, as confirmed by the growth of
click-through payments. The main entities involved in click-
through payment programs are the user who views the page
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and clicks on a link, the referrer who exposes advertising
material to the user, and the target site running the click-
through payment process.
A click-through payment system works as: we suppose that
there are two websites A and B, and that A can refer the user
to B. Hence, whenever B receives a referral from A, B has to
pay the webmaster1 of A for this reference. In more detail,
when a user views web page A and clicks on a link that
refers the user to web page B, then A should receive money
from B. In other words, the user has “clicked-through” A
to reach B. The use of a click-through payment program
by the webmaster of B leads to an increase in traffic to the
website, since other websites display links to B. However,
since the underlying infrastructure of this structure is based
on the HTTP protocol, it is exposed to attack.
For a better understanding of how this mechanism is vul-
nerable to fraud, we review the procedure used to exchange
HTTP messages (see Fig. 9) during a click-through event.
As illustrated in Fig. 9, when users view a web page from
site A (called the referrer), the HTTP procedure is executed.
Site A includes a link to site B (called the target), and
agrees to take part in the process of click-through payment
to site B. The customer’s browser sends a request to load
the page from site B when the link is clicked. Site B
can identify the site from which the requested web page
originated (i.e. where the user are is being referred from)
simply by checking the referrer field in the HTTP header.
The previous explanation should reveal that the click-
through payment system has the potential to be exploited for
fraud. The problem arises from the lack of communication
between A and B after the user clicks on the link. A cannot
verify how many times its web page has referred users
to the targeted page, and as a consequence, B is able to
omit some of the click-through events from the referrer,
in a scheme called hit shaving. In addition, although the
referrer site can detect that the target site has shaved its
referrals, it cannot provide proof of this to a third party.
A can also conduct fraud against B by generating false
requests in order to increase the payment from B, and this
is called hit inflation. In brief, hit shaving is a form of fraud
by a dishonest advertiser who can undetectably change the
number of clicks received from a publisher in order to pay
a lower commission fee [37], [59].
• Hit Inflation. This is a fraudulent activity performed by an
adversary to inflate the hit count, in order to boost revenue
or hurt competitors.
In [60], a sophisticated type of hit inflation attack is defined
that is very hard to detect. Fig. 10 illustrates this attack
scenario, which involves an association between a fraudulent
website (W) and a fraudulent publisher (P), where W uses
a script code to silently divert a user to P. The scenario
starts when a user simulates a request or click to fetch
page W. html from W (step 1). However, the user is
redirected to page P. html (step 2). P has two forms of the
web page: a manipulated form and a valid form. P will show
a manipulated web page to the user when the referrer field
1The webmaster is the person controlling the content served to the user.
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Figure 9: Workflow for a click-through system. Step 1: user retrieves
Page A. html from site A (referrer site). Step 2: user clicks on a link
in site A and requests the page from site B (target site). Step 3:
Page B. html on site B will be uploaded for the user.
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Figure 10: Hit inflation attack on online advertising network.
in the HTTP request shows W (step 3) and clicks the ad
by itself without knowing the user. Otherwise, P will direct
the user to the valid web page, and the user is free to either
click on the ad or not (step 4, 5).
Publishers and advertisers are the two entities in online
advertising systems that are the major sources of inflation
attacks. The two most common types of hit inflation attack
are called publisher click inflation and advertiser competitor
clicking. We briefly illustrate both types of attack below.
Publisher click inflation. In publisher click inflation, a
dishonest publisher is motivated to artificially inflate the
click-through count (without real interest in the content of
the advertisement) to obtain more income from ad networks.
As discussed earlier, if the advertiser wants to present its
advertisements on the publisher’s website, the publisher
enters into a contract with the broker (commissioner). The
publisher then gains income from advertisers through the
user-generated traffic that they send to websites of adver-
tisers. Obviously, the more clicks the publishers earn, the
more money they generate. Consequently, this opens the
way for malicious publishers to create illegal revenue by
increasing the numbers of clicks, impressions, and actions
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on their websites.
Publisher click inflation attacks can be classified into two
categories: non-coalition and coalition attacks [61]. The
former is performed by a single publisher (one fraudster)
who solely generates traffic to its resource(s), while the
latter involves a coalition attack among a group of publishers
who share their systems. If we can detect both categories
of attack, we can claim that the problem of hit inflation is
solved.
Launching a coalition attack has several benefits for fraud-
sters. Firstly, the possibility of fraud detection decreases
because the attackers do not need to reuse their resources
to generate more attacks [62], making it difficult for de-
tection algorithms to identify the relationships (e.g., the
relationships between the cookie IDs and IP addresses of
the resources generating traffic and the sites of fraudsters)
between each fraudster and all the attacking machines. Sec-
ondly, the cost of launching an attack is reduced by sharing
resources rather than increasing the number of physical
resources. Fig. 11 illustrates non-coalition and coalition
attacks [63].
The study in [37] classifies non-coalition attacks according
to the number of IPs and the cookie IDs of the system,
and the way in which the commissioners recognize the
machines of the surfers (potential Internet customers). When
customers visit a website, this traffic has certain fixed
characteristics which are different from automatic traffic,
and typically involve relationships between IP addresses and
cookie IDs. Hence, if fraud detectives find inconsistencies
between the cookie IDs and the IP addresses, they can in-
vestigate manually by selecting a subgroup of the publishers
to detect the attack. On the other hand, when dishonest
publishers want to launch the attack, they can leave a false
fingerprint for the relationship between the IPs and cookie
IDs in order to confuse the detection mechanisms.
The attack can be launched by one or multiple IPs, and
these addresses may be associated with no, one or multiple
cookie IDs. There are therefore six possible types of attack
based on combinations of IPs and cookie IDs, as follows.
1) Cookie-Less Attacks. A fraudster can launch cookie-
less attacks in at least two known ways. Firstly, there
is the option for the attacker to turn off cookies on the
system(s) which plan to launch the attack. Secondly, a
fraudster can employ commercial services called network
anonymization, which are designed to protect the privacy
of users [64] and to block third party cookies to give
more cookie-less traffic.
2) Single Cookie and Single IP Address Attacks. In this
type of attack, a dishonest publisher can employ a script
to launch an attack from one machine with a fixed IP and
one cookie ID. The author in [65] provided an example
of this type of script.
3) Single Cookie and Multiple IP Addresses Attacks. At-
tacks of this type are more widespread among fraudulent
advertisers than fraudulent publishers, since changing the
IP address of the attacking machines is more convenient
than changing the cookie ID. The commissioner shows
the most profitable advertisements to Internet customers
that have not recently been displayed. In addition, if
repeating the same cookie sends to the commissioner, as
a consequence, the same advertisements display to the
users. Hence, a dishonest advertiser can start the attack
by visiting the publisher’s website and continuing until
the broker shows advertisements from its competitors.
The fraudster then stores the cookie ID with the intention
to continuously applying the ID to force the broker to
show the advertisements from its competitors. In this
way, it can simulate clicks on advertisements in order
to drain its competitors’ advertising budgets.
4) Multiple Cookies and Single IP Address Attacks. An
attacker can perform this type of attack in various forms.
The simplest method is to connect different systems
to the Internet via a single router, and then execute
various scripts on the systems. In this way, the attacker
can simulate receiving traffic with several cookie IDs
but a single IP address. However, this type of attack
is not economically viable. This attack suffers from a
resemblance to the regular Internet traffic problem, in
which different customers connect to the Internet with
various cookie IDs using a single IP address through an
ISP.
In the second form, in order to make the attack more
comprehensive and sophisticated, the attacker can con-
nect several machines to the internet via an ISP with
a similar IP. To reduce the impact of this malicious
attack and defraud the detection algorithms, a dishonest
publisher can combine fraudulent traffic with regular
traffic.
5) Multiple Cookies and Multiple IP Addresses Attacks.
Performing and detecting this class of attack is difficult.
The malicious publisher uses various valid cookies and
IPs. The attacker can perform this type of attack by
using the cookies and IPs in multiple forms. In the
most simple form, which is not economically viable, the
attacking publisher has access to various machines with
different accounts with ISPs. Another method is to use
botnets, such as spyware and Trojans. The aim of using
a botnet [66] is to simulate impressions and clicks on
the website of the attacker by sending the proper HTTP
requests while exploiting the cookies and IPs of legal
users. The traffic generated in this way is very similar to
regular traffic.
This type of attack can be considered a more sophisti-
cated version of some of the above examples. Suppose
that the publisher has access to different legal cookies
and IPs, such that IPs can generate random or can be pre-
assigned. Then, whenever a cookie ID and a pre-assigned
IP is used in the attack, the attack can be considered a
more sophisticated version of the multiple cookies/single
IP attack that uses multiple IPs. In contrast, when the
IP is selected randomly, this results in the use of iden-
tical cookies for different IPs. This attack can also be
considered a more sophisticated version of the single
cookie/multiple IPs attack with multiple cookies.
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Figure 11: Non-coalition and coalition attacks. Fig. 11a: in a non-coalition attack, each attacker creates traffic to its own website; Fig. 11b:
in a coalition attack, each attacker creates traffic to both its own website and those of others in the coalition.
Advertiser competitor clicking. In this attack, malicious
advertisers carry out hit inflation attacks against their com-
petitors to drain their advertising budgets. In the case
where competitors have limitations on their daily advertising
budget to participate in bidding, fraudsters can increase
the probability of their advertisements being displayed by
winning the auction.
More generally, the consequences of fraudulent traffic in-
clude reducing the reputation of the commissioner and at-
tracting fewer advertisers, and also may lead to extra fees or
penalty payments for advertisers [67], [68].
C. Malvertising
The primary goal of the online advertising system is to
reach users, and these entities are therefore more vulnerable
to threat in this system than the others. We recall that the
online advertising system is based on users’ web browsing
interests. As users surf the web, their movements within
websites enable ad providers to track them (e.g., by using
tracking cookies [69]) and identify them to deliver targeted
advertisements in the future. Many ad companies such as
Google or Yahoo monitor how visitors have landed on their
website with the help of tracking cookies. The main problem
with using tracking cookies is the violation of the individual’s
privacy.
When a user navigates the Internet and visits different
websites associated with a single advertiser, the same cookies
are allocated to the user. In this way, the ad provider can track
the user’s online activities by compiling the information from
the cookies without the user’s permission or consent. The con-
sequence of this tracking is that the user’s privacy is violated.
Moreover, users can be involved in fraud (e.g., click fraud)
without realizing. Malvertising (malicious advertisements) is
another fast-growing security threat on the web that can infect
users [13].
Malvertisement is a platform for distributing malware by
injecting malicious code into legitimate ad networks. This ma-
licious code eventually attempts to redirect users to malicious
websites that serve malware [70].
As previously mentioned, there are several entities involved
in an online advertising system, making it a complex network.
This complexity and the use of multiple redirections between
different components allows attackers to embed malicious con-
tent (e.g., malicious advertisements) in places that publishers
and ad networks would not expect. For example, an report by
Blue Coat [71] shows that JavaScript code can be served by
an ad server to inject a hidden iframe tag into a benign site
instead of fetching legitimate advertisements. In this scheme,
the iframe commands the browser of the victim to silently
interact with a malware server, allowing a PDF exploit file
to be downloaded. Both publishers and advertisers in the
online advertising ecosystem have the potential to launch a
malvertising threat; for instance, an advertiser can easily inject
a malicious ad into a legal ad network to trigger malvertising.
As a result, the advertising network may deploy those adver-
tisements on publishers’ websites, and users will then access
them by clicking. Moreover, publishers can insert malicious
content into their sites to indirectly cause a consumer to install
malware. In this scheme, users even do not need to click on
advertisements to activate malware. One of the most common
forms of malvertising is flash-based advertisements [72], in
which an Adobe Flash File (also referred to as a SWF)
that contains malicious script is abused by criminals to run
arbitrary commands. Creating advertisements with animation
and sound in an SWF file allows the advertisers to attract
a greater audience, and this means that Flash is vulnerable
to being used in malicious attacks. It is therefore clear that
attackers can spread malicious advertisements via Flash, which
is known as “malvertisement” [72].
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. NN, XX 2020 12
D. Inflight Modification of Ad Traffic
In [13], a new form of ad fraud was presented that involves
the inflight modification of advertising traffic (also called a
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack). An well-known example
of this type of fraud is the Bahama botnet, which allows mal-
ware to force compromised machines to show surfers altered
advertisements, and to change the results of searches [73].
The key difference between this attack and traditional click
fraud is that in the latter case, ad networks can gain income
from fraudulent clicks, while inflight modification of ad traffic
can allow either traffic or income to be diverted from the ad
networks to the attacker’s server.
In the Bahama botnet, compromised systems direct users
to a malicious site that looks identical to real Google search
results. In this case, the attacker leads the user traffic to another
site of the attacker’s choosing, such as a fake website, by
corrupting the translation of the Domain Name System (DNS)
on the infected systems. For example, when a compromised
user clicks on advertisements on Yahoo or Google, they are
silently redirected to a server that is under the attacker’s con-
trol. Consequently, the domain name/hostname “Google.com”
(or Yahoo.com) translates to an IP address that belongs to the
attacker and not to Google (or Yahoo).
Moreover, a viewer can enter a query into the input box
that appears to belong to the Google server, but the traffic
is in fact redirected to the poisoned server. The user is sent
back (malicious) results for the given query from Google, i.e.
results that are different from the real ones. Clicking on these
fake results leads to the click-through payment program being
triggered, and thus to advertisers receiving money, meaning
that click fraud has taken place. In the case of Bahama
botnet, income is diverted from main ad networks to smaller
publishers and ad networks.
The adversary can also use botnets of compromised wireless
routers rather than compromising the users’ systems [74].
In this scheme, the wireless router, which is hacked by
malware, is converted to a bot. The botnet master can then give
instructions to launch an inflight modification of traffic attack
to transmit traffic through the router. Many public hotspots
operate on this model by providing users with free Wi-Fi while
embedding advertisements in the users’ traffic to earn more
money.
In-flight modification of ad traffic has a drawback in that
if a user clicks on the displayed advertisements, profit is
generated for the fraudster rather than the legal ad network.
Hence, this attack weakens the network industry model. It is
worth noting that there are other catastrophic effects of these
attacks in terms of the security of end-users (as it leads to
malvertisement rather than legitimate advertisements), and also
a loss of reputation and income for legal advertisers.
E. Adware
According to [75], [76], adware (advertising software) is
software with advertisements embedded in the application that
can display advertisements without the user’s knowledge. This
type of software is mainly used to show advertisements with
the help of the websites users visit. The primary goal of this
software is typically to make a profit based on the collection of
marketing information or by displaying advertisements. Some
people consider adware to be similar to malvertising, but there
are notable differences between them: the target of adware
is a single user, while malvertising serves malicious code to
be deployed on a publisher’s web page. Adware is code that
runs continuously on a user’s machine, while malvertising
can only affect the user’s machine when the infected web
page is viewed. Both advertisers and publishers can produce
adware, and this software can therefore be divided into two
main categories.
The first group of adware is known as shareware. This is
designed for consumers who are not willing to pay for specific
software, and numerous ad-supported software, games, and
utilities have been distributed as adware. This type of software
automatically displays advertisements in the form of annoying
pop-up messages, and users have an option to disable these
advertisements if they buy a license key. Moreover, when users
uninstall the software, the advertisements should disappear.
The developer uses the adware to recover the costs of develop-
ment, and this approach allows consumers to use the software
free of charge or for a low price. The revenue from displaying
advertisements is the source of motivation for the developers,
and helps them to carry out the development, maintenance,
and upgrading of the software. For example, the Eudora mail
client is a substitute for shareware registration fees to use for
displaying advertisements to the users.
The second category can be thought of as a kind of spyware.
This group stealthily collects information on customers by
spying on them, in order to serve advertisements embedded in
websites. In formal terms, these types of applications contain
adware that tracks the user’s Internet surfing habits to display
advertisements associated with the user. This type of adware
acts as an intrusive application with respect to the user’s data,
and users need to protect their system against this software
for security and privacy reasons. This adware is able to gather
information about the individuals by surfing unauthorized sites
via the Internet connection, and by monitoring the user’s
favorites list and browser profile. The adware can even collect
the required information by continually monitoring the search
toolbars of browsers without the user’s awareness or permis-
sion. In extreme cases, the adware sells this private information
to other entities without the awareness or permission of the
user. This adware can also hijack the user’ web browser
homepage and search engines in such a way that they cannot
be changed.
For instance, YapBrowser is adware or spyware that can
serve unrequested, offensive advertisements, modify system
configuration settings and redirect users to unwanted websites.
This software is illegally installed on the user’s machine to
create revenue for spyware and adware owners. UK’s Search-
WebMe assured users in June 2006 that the updated version of
YapBrowser did not contain either adware or malicious apps
to sniff and gather private information from users. Last but
not least, Gator and Bargain Buddy are two other popular
adware programs in this class, and were developed by Claria
Corporation and Exact Advertising, respectively.
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IV. COUNTERMEASURES FOR ONLINE ADVERTISING
ATTACKS
Over recent years, the field of online advertising security has
attracted attention from many researchers in both Academia
and Industry. Several solutions have been proposed to tackle
the security threats identified in Section III.
Motivated by this consideration, we discuss several ap-
proaches proposed in the literature to combat various types of
attacks on online advertising systems. Table III summarizes
the existing detection methods for online advertising systems
and gives a preliminary overview of the pros and cons of using
these methods.
A. Countermeasures to Hacking
When Google AdWords [77] was launched in 2000 and
quickly became Google’s primary source of revenue, it soon
became a rich source of targets for ad fraud attacks.
Various reports and forums have discussed the fact that the
majority of Gmail address and passwords are used to hack
campaign accounts. The different approaches used to hack
Google AdWords accounts can be categorized as (i) brute
force login attacks; (ii) email spoofing; and (iii) malware and
spy tools for obtaining user account information [78]. When
fraudsters enter to a campaign account, they can duplicate
campaigns. Attackers can also generate enormous numbers of
clicks and redirect destination URLs to other companies [79],
[80].
One of the more straightforward options for preventing this
type of attack is to select strong passwords. The security
and protection of an account can be increased by choosing a
complicated and lengthy password combining letters and num-
bers with special characters, and by changing the password
regularly. It is also possible to monitor and control browsers
with phishing filters [81], especially when connecting to un-
secured WIFI connections and signing in to Google accounts.
Industries and business owners should have a contingency
advertising plan for monitoring their revenue trends to handle
the drop in revenue caused by fraudulent campaigns.
To detect hacking attacks in online advertising, a daily check
can be carried out of accounts to guarantee not only the cost-
benefit ratio and performance of the campaign but also to
protect the campaign from reputational damage and loss of
income. It is vital to monitor and analyze the performance of
each AdWords campaign on a daily basis [9].
B. Countermeasures to Crowd Fraud
As discussed in Section III-B1, there are significant dif-
ferences between automatic fraudulent behaviors and frauds
carried out by humans. The most immediate difference is that
crowd fraud usually derives from a large number of attacking
machines, while the malicious generated traffic from each
computer is low. Another major difference is that fraudulent
behaviors by web workers are irregular and have no specific
order, allowing the suspicious traffic generated in this way
to blend into normal traffic. Based on these differences, we
can conclude that short-term crowd fraud can appear approx-
imately similar to normal individual behaviors. As a result,
conventional fraud detection methods are unable to detect
crowd fraud.
The techniques typically used in business markets for
crowd fraud detection mainly emphasize human interactions,
including prior knowledge of malicious queries and principles
associated with filtering. These approaches are costly, and tend
to become invalid quickly because web workers may change
their patterns of behavior to avoid detection.
To address these problems, the authors of [43] investigated
the group behaviors associated with crowd fraud, and found
that compared with the individual actions of each worker,
which may involve considerable noise, group behaviors were
more continuous.
In formal terms, these authors discovered certain typical
feature distributions and network functions of crowd fraud
that can be effectively applied to detect this activity. They
noted the following aspects: (i) moderateness: crowd fraud
sometimes targets advertisers or queries with medium hit
frequencies; (ii) synchronicity: Internet users participating in
crowd fraud can classify into coalitions [82] via which they
typically target a distinct collection of advertisers and execute
the fraud quickly; and (iii) dispersivity: surfers involved in
crowd fraud may search for an irrelevant series of topics and
click advertisements from different industries simultaneously.
Based on the attributes mentioned above, the authors of [43]
introduced an efficient solution for crowd fraud in search
engine advertising, which was divided into three phases: con-
structing, clustering, and filtering. In the constructing phase,
they deleted irrelevant data from raw data logs of queries that
did not meet the moderateness condition (e.g., either markedly
small or large hit frequencies) to create a surfer-advertiser
bigraph in which each edge referred to a single unique click
history and included aspects such as search queries and hit
times. Finally, they built a surfer-advertiser inverted list for this
bigraph for the next phase. In this list, each entry referred to
the click history for each unique surfer. In the clustering phase,
they described the sync-similarity between click histories to
discover coalitions of surfers, indicating synchronicity.
Next, they converted the coalition detection system into a
clustering problem that could be solved through a nonpara-
metric clustering algorithm (such as DP-means [83]). After the
clustering phase, the percentage of finding coalitions was high,
and this caused false detections and therefore false alarms.
For instance, in some business domains such as healthcare
or games, regular Internet users with related interests may
repeatedly click on the same advertisements to receive similar
services. Hence, using infiltering, they created a filter for
clusters based on the dispersivity to eliminate false alarm
clusters.
Since this method does not require tuning of any parameters,
it can be applied in real scenarios to find an infinite number
of coalitions without human interaction. The authors also built
a parallel version of their detection method (by parallelizing
the nonparametric clustering algorithm) to make the system
more scalable for massive web searching. The results of this
experiment validated the accuracy and scalability of their
approach. Although the proposed algorithm was capable of
detecting crowd fraud, however, it failed to prevent this fraud.
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Moreover, evaluating the accuracy of the algorithm was hard
due to the difficulty of collecting fraud data.
C. Countermeasures to Badvertising
A successful badvertisement stealthily and artificially gen-
erates automatic clicks on advertisements when users visit a
site hosted by a fraudster, and can persist unseen by auditors
from the ad provider. It does not require any specific technical
knowledge to run this kind of attack, and any illegal webmaster
can perform it [44].
At first glance, it may seem easy to detect this attack by
controlling the click-through rate (CTR2) from the intended
domain, but this is not always the case. For example, the at-
tacker can generate both click-throughs and non-click-throughs
by manipulating the traffic in the damaged page, while the
customers correlated to those types are not informed of the
advertisement. It should be noted that the owners of the site
who earn income for a “badvertiser” may not be aware of their
participation in running the attack. For example, the owners
of a domain may be pretending not to know of the existence
of an attack, or may be fooled by a corrupt webmaster. The
former case corresponds to a phishing attack [84].
Developing tools for the discovery and prevention of fre-
quent click fraud attacks is a major aim of industries in
this field. AdWatcher [85] and ClickProtector [86] are two
well-known companies that try to detect and prevent such
attacks. The most common attack types are malware-based,
which use automated scripts, individuals hired to deplete
their competitors’ advertising budget [87] or proxy servers to
generate fake clicks. These attacks can be detected by tracking
the IP addresses of the systems that generate the clicks or by
distinguishing the click registered domains. Companies try to
identify aspects such as duplicate clicks for a specific ad by
a single IP address or irregularities in the traffic history, and
to carry out careful analyses. However, a badvertising attack
cannot easily be detected using these approaches, and there is
a pressing need for other types of mechanisms to detect and
prevent this attack.
The countermeasures discussed in [44] involve the construc-
tion of a ad code to detect an attack when preventing it is not
possible. These methods can be divided into two types: active
and passive. Active methods are used to detect click fraud,
while passive methods are used to monitor the progress of a
click fraud.
In formal terms, an active client-side solution is based
on interactions with search engines, the execution of public
searches, and visits to the resulting sites. It can carry out web
surfing in a manner similar to the user. An active mechanism
can conceal its status such that an agent cannot recognize it
as a robot, and can present itself as a real user to the servers
in order to interact with the agent and other entities.
In contrast, passive client-side approaches monitor the ac-
tions performed by users that lead to a click. It is possible
to trap requests for advertisements by virtual execution of
JavaScript code, and any attempt to display a specific web
2 The CTR is the number of clicks an advertiser (i.e., publisher or ad) gains
as a proportion of the impressions.
page in a way that it should be occurring after a click can
be considered a fraudulent request. It should be pointed out
that although this solution can be used against automatic click-
fraud, it cannot be applied to protect a system against a type of
attack that first creates a significant delay and then performs a
click fraud. The only way to do this and to capture a delay is to
let the virtual machine randomly select scripts for generating
a delay.
We should recall that long delays are not preferred by
attackers, since their session might be disconnected from the
target before they can generate a click on the website. Passive
client-side methods can be included with security toolboxes
or anti-virus programs.
Another form of passive scheme is an infrastructure com-
ponent. That can detect click fraud by shifting traffic, identi-
fying candidate traffic and mimicking the system of the user
receiving the packets. Example applications of infrastructure
component schemes include an ISP-level spam filter and MTA.
We can conclude from a performance analysis that if a
client-side detection mechanism is installed only by a small
proportion of customers, these attacks become entirely unprof-
itable.
D. Countermeasures to Hit Shaving
The author of [88] explained that the rationale behind all
inflation and deflation fraud (also called hit shaving) is a lack
of knowledge. In both attacks, the entities who perform the
fraud may under- or over-count transactions for financial gain,
and it is difficult for the victim to prove the damage that
arises. As a consequence, a general technique for detecting
these frauds is to collect information relating to the victim’s
claim.
For example, in the case of deflation fraud, the authors
of [88] proposed the use of an online Trusted Third Party
(TTP) as a mediator to facilitate interactions between two
parties. To detect deflation fraud, the publisher must collect
as much information as it can, based on the advertiser’s
claim. In a nutshell, the more info a publisher can gather,
the stronger the detection scheme. The disadvantage of this
solution is that it cannot be applied to the online advertising
ecosystem. Similarly, in Google’s AdWords, the publisher
directly monitors the transactions. The methods mentioned
above suffer from a lack of scalability and efficiency, since
the publisher can interfere in the business operation of the
advertiser and in turn with the TTP.
In [58], an efficient and flexible mechanism was proposed
to relax the security solution slightly. The authors point out
that there is a certain level of tolerable counting error for
the publisher if they miss some transactions. Their mecha-
nism involved a novel deflation fraud detection scheme that
applied cryptography and probability-based techniques with
the following features: (i) the publisher can detect deflation
fraud with a high probability of success, and the security
parameters can be tuned by the publisher to provide a balance
between cost-effectiveness and security assurance; (ii) under
these conditions, the web publisher can estimate and detect
the expected number of transactions on a large scale; (iii)
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although a transaction takes place only between advertiser
and users, the proposed scheme is easy for end-users, since
they are not required to keep any secret information; (iv) the
costs (such as computation, communication, and storage) of
this method are all constant, making the scheme efficient and
scalable.
The proposed hybrid method does not require the coopera-
tion of a third party, and retains the simplicity of the current
advertising system. The publisher also has the option to tune
the security parameters to balance the security and cost of the
model. The drawback of the proposed scheme is the need for
manual tuning of parameters by the publisher.
Although there are many click-through payment mecha-
nisms on the web, the publishers cannot verify whether they
have received payment for each click-through to the target site.
This allows for hit shaving, in which the target sites can avoid
paying the publisher sites for some click-throughs.
The study in [45] proposed some rapid and straightforward
approaches to enable referrers to track the number of click-
throughs, allowing them to be aware of how much money they
are owed. These methods included ways of creating web pages
and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts that offer the
referrer webmasters a greater ability to monitor the numbers
of legal clicks, and also which pages the users click. They
implemented these approaches by placing upper bounds and
lower bounds on referrals. These are effective techniques that
do not require awareness or cooperation by the webmasters of
the sites to which the referrals are made.
The authors also explore more aggressive approaches for
cooperating with the providers of click-through mechanisms,
to allow webmasters to more accurately control the number
of click-throughs. Although this second group of approaches
requires cooperation by the webmasters of the click-through
payment programs, it does not need trusted webmasters, since
any failure to cooperate is quickly detectable. This is a robust
solution: a referrer can discover this fraud after 20 times
probe even if the target shaves only 5% of the commission.
However, this method is not always feasible, for example if the
target website sells expensive items. In this method, referrers
are expected to report their payments for leads and sales
correctly, with the help of the target sites. Although techniques
presented here are mainly invisible to the web user, their main
disadvantage is the communication overhead for implementing
the protocol, which causes it to be an inefficient and inflexible
scheme.
E. Countermeasures to Malvertising
As discussed in detail in Section III-C, malvertising can
affect both web users and publishers in different ways. Malver-
tising can redirect users to malicious sites [89] or install
malware on the user’s computer simply by viewing the ad,
without even clicking it. This results in losses of reputation,
traffic and revenue for the publishers, and even if publishers
are aware of this attack, it is difficult for them to find and
block malicious advertisements, since the online advertising
ecosystem is dynamic and displays advertisements from a vast
number of advertisers.
To avoid malvertising, the authors of [13] suggest checking
the advertisements regularly and validating their appropriate-
ness. It is the responsibility of the publishers and ad networks
to verify the advertising content (whether active or malicious)
by performing regular checks. They should avoid publishing
advertisements to end-users if publishers and ad networks
become aware of any unexpected or unwanted behavior in the
code, such as automated redirections. For example, in June
2009, Google launched an investigative research engine to
help ad networks by regularly checking the source code of
websites. This search engine is publicly available at www.anti-
malvertising.com, and enables ad networks to detect potential
malvertising providers. Surfers also need to update/install anti-
malware programs on their systems to protect against such
risks.
F. Countermeasures to Inflight Modification of Ad Traffic
As in [90], the authors of [13] proposed data integrity
and authentication tools to ensure end-to-end security for
communication to prevent inflight modification. However, the
use of these mechanisms has certain disadvantages that make
them challenging to deploy on a wide scale. Firstly, web
content protection depends on cryptographic processes that
impose a high computational cost on servers [90]. Secondly,
since the authentication mechanism uses digital certificates to
activate Web servers authentication, which are expensive since
certificate authorities are required carry out authentication of
web servers manually. Clearly, if a site has a certificate as-
signed by a trusted certification authority, a trusted connection
can be made that helps browsers to authenticate websites [13].
Web administrators also prefer to use a customized self-
signed certificate without relying on third-party certification
authorities to avoid the extra cost; however, such self-signed
certificates are vulnerable to MITM attacks, and do not provide
a reliable solution that allows the web browser to identify the
website, and users need to decide whether or not to trust the
corresponding website [91]. From the user’s point of view, it is
complicated to determine the operation of a given certificate
and to validate it. As a result, a malicious server can often
communicate with users. A notary office can be established
to control the consistency of the web server’s public keys
and to help the user verify self-signed certificates. Although
this technique is a new and reliable solution, it has the same
limitations as the scheme in [90].
To tackle the above problems, researchers have introduced
several alternative approaches to protect Web content effec-
tively [92]–[94]. For example, in [92], the authors present
a new opportunistic encryption method for encrypting web
communications, involving a secure channel without other host
authentication. However, this technique is unable to protect
systems against MITM attacks, since the attacker can easily
access the certificates used for authentication and replace them
to impersonate web page. In other work, the authors of [93]
adopted a web-based measurement tool called Web Tripwire
to detect inflight changes to websites. This method can inject
JavaScript code into the site and monitor the HTTP web page
to identify any changes in it. The tool immediately reports any
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modifications to the web page to both the end-user and the web
server. Tripwire is a cheaper tool than HTTPS, which checks
the integrity of pages, but is a non-cryptographically secure
method. In [94], a secure scheme based on a collaboration
between ad networks and web servers was introduced to coun-
teract inflight traffic modification. This method is based on the
fact that ad networks with digital authentication certificates can
ensure the authenticity and integrity of the traffic. However,
the implementation of this method imposes a high cost on
publishers and ad networks.
G. Countermeasures to Adware
Untrusted websites generally deliver spyware and adware to
unaware customers [13], and it is therefore better that users
avoid these kinds of sites. Users are also advised to install
or update their anti-adware software regularly. Finally, some
free software has the potential to install adware in the user’s
system, and the user therefore needs to pay attention to license
agreements and installation screens before installing them.
H. Countermeasures to Hit Inflation
Due to the nature of hit inflation attacks, they are an
important concern for advertising commissioners [95]. Most
research to date has focused on publisher fraud, since this
can also be generalized to advertiser fraud. In the following
subsections, we therefore concentrate on publisher fraud unless
it is specifically necessary to investigate advertiser fraud.
We start with examples of classical approaches to inflation
fraud detection in Section IV-H1, and give an overview of
cryptography-based methods in Section IV-H2. We conclude
that the commissioner cannot track individual computers to
identify fraud due to violations of user privacy. Finally, in
Section IV-H3, we argue that the application of statistical
analysis to streams of traffic is the most appropriate way to
detect hit inflation.
1) Classical Approach: Classical fraud detection, also
called offline fraud detection, employs a variety of metrics
to evaluate publishers according to the quality of traffic to
their websites [59]. It should be emphasized that the quality
of traffic can be measured by its adaptation with normal
network traffic. In classical detection methods, brokers can
store the total traffic in databases and validate the quality
(based on certain metrics) of the stored traffic using complex
SQL scripts.
One of the most appropriate metrics is the CTR of the
advertisements, which is constant across websites of the same
type [65], while advertisements of different types have dif-
ferent CTRs on identical sites. If the website automatically
visits and clicks, consequently, not only produce similar CTRs
for the advertisements but rather the CTR of the displayed
advertisements deviates from the normal values. Commis-
sioners can develop this technique to monitor the behavior
of advertisements by loading empty advertisements into the
websites of publishers and checking clicks on these false
advertisements.
However, classical metrics have several problems. They are
not efficient metrics, since fraudsters can easily circumvent
traditional tools, and can fool classical detection tools by abus-
ing the site architecture [37] of a specific publisher to model
the network metrics of advertisements and gain information
about the parameters of the advertisements displayed on their
website.
A lack of scalability is the second problem. It should
be noted that the average impressions per second currently
received by the commissioner is 20K, corresponding to 70M
records that need to be stored in a database per hour. It is
clear that executing SQL scripts to compute these metrics will
lead to a decrease in database performance, and commission-
ers therefore execute them only periodically. Moreover, the
updating of these metrics is also not scalable. Each click on
an ad in any site may mean that the statistical parameters and
the ranking of the website need to be recalculated.
Thirdly, the classical approach was developed before In-
ternet advertising reached maturity, and hence represents the
standard conflict between advertisers and commissioners. Traf-
fic that does not adapt with the network metrics may be legal,
although it will be low-quality traffic. Since classical methods
are unable to detect malicious intent, they omit legitimate
traffic with low quality.
2) Cryptographic Approach: There are various crypto-
graphic methods in the literature that can replace off-line mea-
sures. The central idea behind these is to change the industry
standard to give fraudulent publishers less chance to conduct
fraud [96]. For example, in [97], a simple model involving e-
coupons was developed. In this model, the advertiser exploits
cryptographic algorithms to produce coupons and distributes
them to the publishers. Then, the publishers redistribute the
coupons to users, who can use these cryptographic coupons
to purchase items from the websites of advertisers. Web
advertisers favor this model because it is based on pay-per-
sale. Most publishers prefer to be paid based on the number
of clicks or impressions, since this relates to the load on their
servers.
Conversely, advertisers can exploit the model to receive a
vast amount of clicks or impressions, which are essential to
increase awareness of their brand. The authors claim that the
proposed model meets most security and safety requirements;
however, the model is vulnerable to hit shaving attack by
advertisers.
The solution proposed by Goodman [98] is to replace the
current pay-per-click scheme used in online advertising with
a pay-per-impression system. This approach does not involve
a monetary cost to the advertiser for click fraud, since they
are no longer paid per click. The authors of [99] suggest
a cryptographic technique for changing the CPC model to
CPA in which valid clicks are identified rather than invalid
clicks being removed. This model guarantees the legitimacy
of the clicks received by advertisers through a TTP. However,
this model requires sharing information between third parties,
which is not possible due to the security restrictions in modern
browsers.
Other cryptographic methods rely on assistance from users
to identify fraudulent traffic from regular traffic. Different
groups of protocols using basic cryptography methods have
been introduced to count the total number of visitors viewing
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a website [45], [100]. One framework requires users to register
with a broker, from which the user receives a token from the
broker to use free services on the website of the publisher. The
broker also shares the corresponding token with the publisher
to allow them to recognize registered users. In this way, each
time a user visits the publisher’s website and sends a token-
based authentication to the publisher, access is granted to that
free service. The user updates the publisher via a hash function
when an authentication token is sent to the publisher. Since
publisher cannot predict the cost of the next visit (but can
verify the value of the token), the number of user visits stored
in the last token is sent back to the publisher at accounting
time.
There are some limitations to this framework. Firstly, it
presumes that the users trust brokers to download code to run
the hash function [101] and communicate with the publishers’
servers. Secondly, it suffers from a lack of scalability, since
numerous hash functions are required (one for each user).
Thirdly, this scheme needs brokers to identify users uniquely
in order to be effective, although exposing personal informa-
tion on the users to the brokers violates the user’s privacy.
The last problem can be handled by user registration in the
broker’s website (by exposing the user’s personal information).
Brokers can also track and monitor the behavior of users by
downloading spyware [102] onto their systems.
3) Data Analysis Approach: Many advanced data analysis
technologies have been developed to alleviate the problems
caused by cryptographic methods. As mentioned above, a
broker needs to deal with the conflict between protecting the
user’s privacy and security, and the best way to address this
challenge is to carry out statistical analysis on collected data
(such as cookie IDs and IPs) with the help of temporary user
identification. The analysis of IPs and cookie IDs is more
privacy-friendly than cryptographic methods.
Commissioners can also track users based on their cookie
IDs and IPs. In the current Internet architecture, the use
of cookies and IPs to detect fraud can be a less intrusive
technique than methods requiring user login. Cookies do not
store any personal information, and the user has the ability to
block, accept, or periodically clear them [103]. IP addresses
can also be assigned to the user temporarily, and can be shared
with other users. There is therefore no reason to change the
industry model and to obfuscate the identity of the users when
applying data analysis methods to cookie IDs and IPs, and
these methods can detect fraud with high accuracy [46].
Several data analysis techniques have been proposed in
the literature to detect and fight click fraud [104], [105].
The principal aim of these technologies is to find particular
patterns that characterize fraudulent traffic [106]. The known
data analysis approaches to defending against hit inflation are
described below.
Detecting duplicate clicks. Since some publishers try to
increase the number of clicks on their websites by clicking
the same advertisement, some detection techniques rely on
searching for duplicate clicks in the clickstream [57], [105].
The detection of duplicate clicks within a short time (for
example single a day) raise suspicion for the commissioner.
In classical data analysis techniques, the commissioner can
store the total traffic in databases and run complex SQL scripts
to find duplicate clicks within a certain period. However, this
method suffers from scalability and performance problems.
Storing traffic in the database and then checking them to find
duplicate clicks is very expensive for commissioners, since
they receive a vast amount of traffic (an average size of around
70M records is generated per hour). In a online scenario, a
detection scheme also needs to be fast, and should process
the total traffic entry within 50µs. Hit inflation detection is
therefore a critical part of streaming and sampling algorithms.
To cope with the above problem, Metwally et al. [105]
proposed a fast algorithm for detecting duplicate clicks in data
streams. Their algorithm relies on original Bloom filters [107]
and aims to find click fraud with an error rate of less than 1%.
They provide different solutions by considering three types
of window, as follows: sliding windows (finding duplicate
clicks corresponding to the last observed part of the stream);
landmark windows (keeping particular parts of the stream for
deduplication); and jumping windows (a trade-off between the
first two types).
The results of an experiment on a real dataset show that
within one day, one ad was clicked 10,781 times by users
with the same cookie ID. Since the method is successful in
identifying fraudulent intent, it can be considered a comple-
mentary approach to classical schemes that cannot differentiate
low-quality from malicious traffic. However, the method has
high computational complexity of order O(n), since it needs
to keep active click identifications in its memory until they
expire.
To address this problem, two algorithms, namely the Group
Bloom Filter (GBF) and Timing Bloom Filter (TBF) algo-
rithms, were developed in [57]. The difference between them
lies in the number of sub-windows. The GBF can detect click
fraud using jumping windows with a small number of sub-
windows, whilst TBF achieves this using a large number of
sub-windows. These two algorithms involve simple operations
and relatively little storage space, with zero false negatives.
The error rate of duplicate detection is also reduced to less
than 0.1%.
Fabricated impressions and clicks. Other solutions collect
ad traffic across user IPs and cookie IDs to identify fabricated
clicks and impressions. They are based on finding client
behavior (e.g., advertisement traffic) that deviates from normal
behavior [46], [59].
Cryptographic and classical methods cannot determine the
difference between attacks launched by a single publisher
and by a group of publishers (also called a coalition attack).
In principle, making this difference is the main idea behind
the data analysis approach. In coalition attacks, fraudsters
share their machines to reduce the overhead and costs by
carrying out distributed attacks rather than individual ones.
Since numerous publishers share the pattern of fraudulent
traffic, the detection of coalition attacks is difficult. Although
it is easy for coalition attacks to defraud classical methods,
data analysis mechanisms have been developed to try to find
evidence of these attacks [46].
Metwally et al. [104] designed a scheme to detect the hit
inflation attack identified in [60]. They observed that several
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websites could cooperate to make fake clicks and consequently
improve their business interests, and proposed an algorithm
named Streaming-Rules to detect hit inflation in an online
advertising system. This approach relies on discovering the
association rules (defined as forward and backward association
rules) between each pair of corresponding elements in the
stream.
This algorithm requires cooperation between Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISPs) and brokers. An ISP can recognize which
websites are generally visited before a particular website,
while maintaining users’ privacy [108], by analyzing the entire
HTTP requests stream. The authors claimed that Streaming-
Rules could discover the association between elements oc-
curring in a stream with tight error guarantees and minimal
memory usage.
The solution proposed in [104] is not efficient against other
coalition attacks, since it is designed to detect the specific
attack described in [60]. For example, if each adversary in the
coalition attack takes control of the user’s system via Trojans,
then the adversary can separate the HTTP request stream by
ISP, making it impossible to detect the attack using Streaming-
Rules. Hence, in [46], an approach was developed to iden-
tify different types of sophisticated coalition attacks (e.g., a
coalition formed of multiple dishonest publishers) called the
Similarity-Seeker algorithm. This detection mechanism relies
on analyzing traffic to find similarities in the traffic to websites.
Legitimate websites do not have similar traffic, and traffic from
similar sets of IPs is therefore suspicious. The original model
can discover coalition attacks of size two, and the extended
model can find attacks by coalitions of arbitrary sizes. The
exploitation of statistical traffic analysis gives more scalability
than traditional technologies.
Another method presented by Metwally et al. in [109]
called SLEUTH (Single-pubLisher attack dEtection Using
correlaTion Hunting) addresses the problem of fraudulent
traffic generated by a single publisher via several IPs. This
approach focuses on discovering an association between the
publisher and the IP address of a machine. However, SLEUTH
is only an adequate solution for a botnet that utilizes a vast
number of IPs, and assumes that the traffic features of non-
fraudulent publishers and IPs are constant. This assumption is
not applicable to online advertising systems, where trends are
highly temporal.
The Clicktok tool used a Non-negative Matrix Factorization
(NMF) algorithm to partition click traffic to identify fraudulent
clicks [110]. The authors claimed that the proposed solution
reached an accuracy of 99.6%. Despite this high efficiency,
however, the solution only works on the user side.
Although these solutions have certain benefits, all of them
are under the threaten of complicated botnet ad fraud [32].
Many compromised machines are used to modify the IPs and
cookie IDs of fraudulent requests.
In [111], the authors described the use of bluff advertise-
ments, an online click-fraud detection strategy that blacklists
malicious publishers based on a predefined threshold. This
approach was designed to display several unrelated/fake adver-
tisements amongst the user’s targeted advertisements, with the
expectation that these advertisements will not be clicked on.
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Figure 12: Proposed research roadmap for measuring and optimizing
the security of online advertising networks.
In addition to monitoring IPs and applying profile-matching
and threshold detection techniques, bluff advertisements can
create some obstacles for botnet owners who want to train their
software. Negative attitudes of users can also be reduced by
decreasing the number of precisely targeted advertisements.
These considerations motivated the authors of [112] to rec-
ommend a technique for advertisers to count the proportion
of invalid clicks on their advertisements by generating fake
ones. Running bluff advertisements leads to an increase in
advertising budgets for advertisers.
All of the above detection methods can only address fraud
after it has occurred. The authors of [113] therefore proposed
a new automated method for preventing click fraud called
clickable CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing
test to tell Computers and Humans Apart). In the proposed
method, customers complete a simple Turing test [114] and are
then diverted to the publisher’s site. Although click fraud can
be identified based on valid users, the loading of CAPTCHAs
requires time and space.
V. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
As discussed in detail in Section III, various types of
security threats can endanger the online advertising ecosystem,
and many types of research have been conducted to deal with
these threats. Nevertheless, there is a shortage of providing
consensus qualitative and quantitative analysis concerning the
security of the online advertising system in these studies.
Fig. 12 shows an overview of four open issues and the
corresponding possible solutions.
Due to the various limitations on previous investigations
and properties of the current online advertising system, we
introduce some possible future research directions towards
building a reliable, secure, and efficient online advertising
ecosystem in Section V-A. In Section V-B, we describe some
possible solutions to mitigate each open issue.
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Table III: Comparison on existing detection methods in online advertising system. Ref. := Reference, Badver. := Badvertising.
Attack Countermeasure Advantage Disadvantage Ref.
H
ac
ki
ng Daily checking of the user’s account 3 Protecting from possible financial
and reputation losses
7 Highly time-consuming [9]
Detection strategies based on human interactions
3 Strong detection scheme 7 Labor costs
7 Becoming invalid quickly due to
rapid change in web workers’
behavior
[43]
C
ro
w
d
Fr
au
d
Substantial randomness solution based on the
group behaviors 3 Robustness, scalable, and reliable
3 No need to tune parameters manually
3 Applicable in real-world
7 Fails in preventing fraud
7 Difficulty in evaluating the ac-
curacy of the algorithm
[88]
B
ad
ve
r. Detecting and preventing Badvertisment via ac-
tive and passive schemes 3 Preserving user privacy 7 Needs third-party interaction
7 Time-consuming
[44]
Collecting information
3 Strong detection scheme 7 Lack of scalability
7 Lack of efficiency
[88]
Using cryptography and probability tools to de-
tect fraud 3 User-friendly and simple model
3 No need third party
3 Constant ad’s communications, com-
putation, and storage cost
7 Need to tune parameters manu-
ally
[58]
H
it
Sh
av
in
g
Enabling the referrer webmasters to monitor the
number of legal clicks 3 No need awareness or cooperation by
the webmasters
7 Communication overhead [45]
Enabling the providers of click-through mecha-
nisms to control the number of clicks 3 Robust
3 No need to honest webmaster
7 Cooperation or awareness by the
webmaster
[45]
M
al
ve
rt
is
in
g
Checking the advertisements regularly and val-
idate their appropriateness by publishers or ad
networks
3 Prevent losses of reputation, traffic,
and revenue
7 Highly time-consuming [13]
Install/update anti-malware software by users
3 Preventing to install malware on the
user’s machine
7 Use up a lot of memory & disk
space and slowing down the sys-
tem
[13]
Data integrity and authentication mechanisms
3 Ensure the end-to-end security of
communications to prevent inflight
modifications
7 Lack of scalability
7 Highly communication cost
[90]
In
fli
gh
tM
od
ifi
ca
tio
n
of
A
d
Tr
af
fic
Using a new encryption method to encrypt Web
communications without other host authentica-
tion
3 Highly scalable 7 Fail to protect the system against
MITM attacks
[92]
Using Web Tripwire to detect inflight changes
to websites 3 A cheaper tool than HTTPS 7 Non-cryptographically secure
method
[93]
Secure scheme based on the collaboration be-
tween ad networks and web servers 3 Ensure authenticity and integrity of
the traffic
7 Additional charge for publishers
and ad networks
[94]
Do not visit the untrusted websites
3 Preventing to deliver adware and
spyware to unaware users
7 Installing adware in the user’s
system by some of the free soft-
ware
[13]
A
dw
ar
e
Install/ Update anti-adware software
3 Preventing to install adware and spy-
ware on the user’s machine
7 Use up a lot of memory & disk
space and slowing down the sys-
tem
[13]
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. NN, XX 2020 20
Table IV: Continued from Table III.
Attack Countermeasure Advantage Disadvantage Ref.
C
la
ss
ic
al
Using a variety of metrics to mon-
itor the quality of the traffic to find
fraud
3 No need third party 7 Lack of efficiency and scalabil-
ity
7 Conflict of interest between
commissioners and advertisers
[59],
[65],
[37]
Changing the industry model based
on pay-per-sale 3 Safe
3 Robust
7 Vulnerable to hit shaving [97]
C
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
ic Changing the pay-per-click model
with the pay-per-impression/ pay-
per-action model
3 Guarantees the legitimacy of the re-
ceiving clicks by advertisers through
a trusted third party
7 Sharing the information between
the third parties
[98],
[99]
H
it
In
fla
tio
n
The assistance of the users to iden-
tify fraudulent traffic from regular
traffic
3 Cost saving by free service 7 Lack of scalability and user pri-
vacy
7 Sharing the information between
the third parties
[45],
[100]
Detecting duplicate clicks:
• Original Bloom Filter algorithm
• GBF algorithm and TBF algo-
rithm
3 Less error rate
3 Requires simpler operations and less
storage space/ Low false-positive
rate
7 Memory waste
7 Theoretical analysis was made
[57],
[105]
D
at
a
A
na
ly
si
s Fabricated impressions and clicks:
• Streaming-Rules algorithm
• Similarity-seeker algorithm
• SLEUTH
• Clicktok
3 Scalability and ability to detect spe-
cific hit inflation
3 Highly scalable
3 High accuracy & ability to detect
complex coalition attacks
3 Low latency
7 Thwarted by sophisticated bot-
net ad fraud
7 Under the threaten of compli-
cated botnet ad fraud
7 Not applicable to online adver-
tising systems
7 Work on the user side
[46],
[59],
[109],
[110]
• Bluff Ads
• CAPTCHAs
3 Put some obstacles against the bot-
net’s owner to train their software
3 Identifying click fraud based on the
valid user
7 Increasing advertisers’ budget
on advertisements
7 Loading CAPTCHAs needs
time and space
[111],
[112]
A. Future Direction
The security, reliability, and efficiency of online advertising
systems rely on four major aspects of research, as described
below.
• Combating ad fraud: Although 2020 is expected to be
a year of growth, this can be subverted by ad fraud. A
report released by Juniper Research states that in 2018,
about $42 billion was lost to ad fraud in the online
advertising business. It is expected that this amount will
grow to $100 billion by 2023. The damages do not simply
involve financial loss, and can affect user privacy and
hide the best performing marketing channels. To deal
with these damages, growth marketers must consider
fraud prevention as a priority. The report claims that
attackers tend to apply methods such as domain spoofing
to increase the number of clicks by misrepresenting a
low-quality site to resemble a high-quality website, rather
than using techniques such as app install farms. As a
result, it is essential to detect which ad clicks are fake and
which are genuine, not an easy task in real-time bidding.
• Demand for transparency. The report in [115] points out
that the majority of the cost allocated to online advertising
currently goes directly to waste, due to fraud or off-target
audiences. However, there are ways to adapt, and trans-
parency can play a significant role in this. For the entities
that are involved in the ad industry, it is vital to know
where their banners are served and where their budgets
are spent, since if control over the budget allocated to
the ad campaign is lost, advertisers will not know what
has been spent where. Advertisers and publishers are
doing business, and their activities therefore aim to make
money, but the fragmentation of this economy means that
media customers spend more high-priced than it’s worth.
• Cross-border complexity. This aspect aims to attract and
protect global users who require multi-currency pric-
ing options. For example, customers from all parts of
the world trust ad providers to give them ad services.
However, the payment methods by ad providers are not
acceptable. As a result, to gain customer loyalty, ad
service providers need to allow them to change money
on their side at suitable exchange rates. In this way, they
can build a sustainable and secure platform to execute
different multi-currency scenarios.
• Disruptive technologies. The online advertising indus-
try has been significantly penetrated by technological
innovations like the Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial
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Intelligence (AI), Augmented Reality (AR), and 5th gen-
eration mobile Internet (or 5G). In 2018, for example,
Google launched a beta experiment involving automatic
ad placement on the basis of AI, and publishers’ incomes
increased by 10%. To gain a competitive advantage in the
market to survive, an enterprise needs to adapt to these
changes faster than others, and the future of companies
who are not ready for the newest technologies is in
question.
B. Suggestion of Security Responses
In this section, we propose some responses to the challenges
introduced in Section V-A.
• Ad fraud has become a significant concern for everyone
involved in the ad industry, and can lead to reductions
in trustworthiness and campaign effectiveness, and the
siphoning of budgets. Many companies have put consid-
erable effort into fighting against ad fraud.
The industry’s primary solution for combating all types
of fraud is the use of Machine Learning (ML) to analyze
the history of attacks and how they appeared, to help
companies predict what will happen next. However, as
mentioned in Section V-A, one of the best and most
efficient solutions to prevent ad fraud is to apply sophis-
ticated click validation mechanisms. This increases the
workload for fraudsters aiming to steal advertisers’ and
brands’ budgets, and makes it uneconomical for them. In
2019, Adjust [116] proposed a standard based on click
validation in which ad channels send impressions with a
unique identifier before the click claim is sent.
As mentioned previously, whenever users click on a
hyperlink in a publisher’s website, the advertiser must
pay a fee. The question therefore arises as to how an
advertiser can verify that the bill received from the
publisher is correct. This poses a challenge and remains
an open issue. In this case, our suggestion is to apply
Verifying Computations without requiring the user to re-
execute [117] them. The fundamental theorem behind this
is a probabilistic proof system, which is composed of two
elements, a prover and a verifier. The prover aims to prove
a mathematical assertion (so-called proof) for the verifier,
while the verifier checks the proof.
However, in practice, this computational technique is not
economically sound. We therefore propose the use of a
blockchain-based scheme for validation and verification.
The concept underlying the blockchain is Distributed
Ledger Technology (DLT), which helps various untrust-
ing and distributed agents to transmit data in a trusted,
secure, and valid way by providing distributed valida-
tion, transparency, and cryptographic immutability [118],
[119]. Recently, a wide range of applications (such as
healthcare [120] and genomics [121]) have begun to use
the blockchain to guarantee trustworthiness in interactions
among untrusting agents. Thus, the blockchain is an
appropriate mechanism to ensure trust in cases which
require long-running computations. We believe that an
important future research direction in the use of validation
clicks to fight ad fraud could be to investigate how
blockchain-based validation can be extended and used to
ensure effective, trusted verifiable computations.
• High levels of transparency play a significant role in
building trust between entities in the online advertising
system and customers. This also affects the relationship
between the publisher and advertiser. One way to help
bring transparency over cost is to create a real-time
analytic method to follow all activities. In the following,
we highlight some other technologies and tools that can
improve and guarantee transparency.
– In 2016, IAB released a Programmatic Fee Trans-
parency Calculator to add transparency to the collabo-
ration between publisher and advertiser. This tool was
designed to help actors in the online advertising market
to define and apply cost models differently. In this way,
they have the flexibility to enter their planning rates
and budgets into the calculator, and then select the
available advertising technologies for the campaign. It
is essential to mention that the calculation cost model
is based on the “% of media.”
– The blockchain can provide security and transparency
for the transfer of data from advertiser to publisher. It is
also possible to do real-time transactions by exploiting
blockchain technology, especially in the case where the
price is obvious to all participating members of the
supply chain.
– A few advertising tools are available to cope with the
transparency challenge, including Havas and Apomaya.
These platforms aim to support transparency by calcu-
lating the fees that media buyers must pay.
• Engineers have expertise in developing ad software that
facilitates multiple-currency and cross-border operations.
They are aware of how to create and maintain smart
billing services that can support multi-currency payments.
We identify some other techniques for coping with the
challenges of cross-border complexity as follows.
– One technique is to integrate a currency converter
calculator into a pre-built framework. This requires
finding an Application Programming Interface (API),
such as currencylayer, Fixer, or XE Currency Data,
to allow regular updating of currency exchange rates
and access to the maximum number of worldwide
currencies.
– Another technique is to provide customers with ac-
cess to different payment gateways, including PayPal,
Secure-Pay, Stripe, Authorize.Net, etc. Offering diverse
payment options can help to attract and retain loyal
customers.
– Ad services can also be provided with adjustable prices
by considering the average transaction cost across
a specific country, since a given amount might be
adequate for one country but too high for another.
• It is not an easy task to apply cutting-edge technologies
when the traditional types work well. For example, it is
difficult for an advertiser to change their ad campaigns
to the emerging ones. However, in this new era, there
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is a need to adapt and be aware of the latest technolo-
gies, and the domain of online advertising systems is
no exception. Emerging technologies such as AI, AR,
IoT, and 5G can help ad tech companies in several
ways. For example, the role of AI is three-fold. Firstly,
the use of AI-based chatbot applications will motivate
users to buy products, since a chatbot allows them to
ask questions, give commands and receive services in a
conversational style. An AI chatbot can read data, analyze
complex information and make decisions based on this
information. Depending on the customer’s question, the
system should refer them to a specific social group to
demonstrate the items that can be purchased. Secondly,
AI provides a method of targeted advertising. Assisted
by the application of machine learning algorithms to big
data, AI can automatically sort marketing messages and
deliver them to the target users, making ad targeting more
accurate and cost-effective. Thirdly, running AI-based
algorithms allows ad mediation to be optimized to max-
imize profits for publishers by finding the best-matched
slots for their advertisements. AI-based advertising helps
companies in four ways: (i) by displaying personalized
advertisements to the relevant customers and minimizing
human effort; (ii) by interacting with audiences in a
natural way; (iii) by reducing errors using a data-oriented
approach for network selection; and (iv) by saving time
through automating the process of ad publishing.
Although AR-based marketing is in its infancy, it has
become interesting to marketers. Since everyone has a
smartphone, advertisement based on AR is now much
easier than before. For example, stores can install AR-
driven ad applications to send customers popup adver-
tisements to tell them about products, and consequently
attract customers to purchase items. AR-based advertis-
ing helps companies in three ways: (i) by providing
targeted and innovative contextual advertising; (ii) by
improving customer experience and making it unique
and immersive; and (iii) by boosting customer loyalty
through interactive advertising.
A report from the IAB found that around 65% of people
in the US own at least one IoT device, and are interested
in receiving advertisements on IoT screens. IoT technolo-
gies can therefore provide new levels of ad targeting.
IoT data can be used to dig even deeper into customers’
habits, interests, preferences, and other factors, and al-
lows advertisers to learn more about their customers to
create customer personas and targeted ad campaigns. It
is also possible to integrate cloud solutions with various
gateways to achieve better results in the ad campaign.
IoT-based ad software can help advertising companies
in three ways: (i) better recognition and prediction of
consumers’ individual preferences and needs to increase
the efficiency and accuracy of target advertisements; (ii)
increased user engagement and satisfaction by providing
them with valuable information about products; and (iii)
improved ad campaign effectiveness.
The arrival of 5G is expected to open up substantial
new opportunities for advertising. Although current 4G
providers have attempted to influence the public regarding
the security and privacy concerns over 5G, the possibility
of achieving Internet speeds 20 times faster than 4G will
tempt both advertisers and consumers. Needless to say,
to fully exploit the potential of 5G in the advertising
industry, all the entities in the industry should prepare
themselves before launching 5G. In the following, we
identify some of the issues that should be considered.
– Faster load speeds. Despite the advent of new tech-
nologies, like AI, AR, and 3D modeling, which have
revolutionized the ad market, advertisers may not be
attracted to online advertising due to issues relating
to speed. With the high speeds of 5G, a new era will
open up for advertisers to exploit customer profiling,
ad creative, targeting, and many more aspects. 5G will
increase the speed of a device from 45 Mbps up to a
maximum of one gigabit, meaning that response times
will be a few milliseconds, thus leading to a decrease in
latency. This can provide a better space for the use of
streaming video (or even deeper augmented and virtual
reality) to create advertisements. It also opens the way
for creating video advertisements, giving customers the
chance to stop scrolling the web page to watch high-
resolution advertisements.
– Precise locations. 5G can not only help advertisers
with ad creation but with targeted advertising. The
targeting of audiences with low-speed Internet was not
straightforward, but 5G paves the way for the creation
of a range of channels that can enable advertisers to
connect directly with consumers. 5G networks can also
enable cloud-based processing to increase speed and
connectivity. With higher speeds, devices can offload
processing into the cloud, meaning that it is not nec-
essary to process data in the devices’ processors, thus
preserving battery life and allowing for more connected
devices.
– Unlocking identity. It is worth pointing out that
advertisers with more digital touchpoints are more
likely to be selected by customers, and should consider
this a chance to learn more information about their
audiences. Not surprisingly, the most significant impact
of 5G will be on the quality and quantity of data in
the system, which will allow the advertiser to target
and capture the correct audience more effectively. To
achieve maximum benefit from the new data, it is vital
to make sure all the basis includes the right technology
partners, the right infrastructure and the right kind of
privacy measures for the use of the data. Moreover, in
the run-up to the introduction of 5G, marketers should
warn stakeholders to consider the principles of privacy
by design when using this valuable data.
In a nutshell, advertising companies can use the potential
of new technologies as follows: (i) AI-based chatbots
can help companies to communicate with their customers;
(ii) AR-based advertisements can lead to more interactive
experiences; (iii) interacting with customers through IoT
devices will allow companies to match advertisements
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with the real interests of the audience; and (iv) the faster
and more sophisticated network speeds available through
5G will allow video resolution to be increased and page
loading times to be reduced, creating more interaction
between customers and advertisers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Online advertising is vital in sustaining the economy of
the Internet, since each party in the system can gain profit.
However, abuse can result in severe damages. In many coun-
tries, there is a lack of legal protection against ad fraud, and
given the amount of ad revenue at stake, online advertising
has become a target for criminals to gain financial incentives
through fraudulent activities.
In this article, we have investigated and discussed the
security aspects of the online advertising market. We first gave
a brief introduction to the online advertising system, followed
by the fundamental concepts that have emerged in relation to
the online advertising system. Next, we presented a state-of-
the-art study of the various forms of security attacks on the
online advertising ecosystem that arise from the weaknesses of
the ecosystem. We then proposed a comprehensive taxonomy
of ad fraud to describe these threats in global terms and
facilitate cooperation among researchers to deal with ad fraud
attacks. We classified the existing solutions that have been
proposed in the literature to cope with these attacks, along with
the limitations and effectiveness of these solutions. Finally, we
presented our view of current research challenges and future
directions to improve existing security solutions in the online
advertising system.
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